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I. INTRODUCTION 
Kate files a class action in federal court, alleging that her former 
employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by engaging 
in a pattern of racial discrimination.  When Kate accepted her job, 
however, she agreed to arbitrate all future claims against the company.  
This contract features a cost-splitting provision that requires Kate to pay 
half of the arbitration’s expenses, a loser-pays clause that allows the 
arbitrator to award the prevailing party its attorneys’ fees, a pay-your-
own-way term that overrides any attorneys’ fees award that would be 
available to Kate, and a class-arbitration waiver that requires Kate to 
arbitrate on an individual basis.  Under what circumstances should a 
court deny the employer’s motion to compel arbitration? 
The issue in Kate’s case hinges on the fraught relationship between 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and other federal statutes.  The FAA 
makes arbitration clauses “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” subject 
only to traditional contract principles.1  Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has 
never rigidly applied this mandate to federal statutory claims.  For 
decades, the Court exempted congressionally created rights from the 
FAA.2  Under what was known as the non-arbitrability doctrine, the 
Court held that Congress did not intend parties to assert public law 
claims in arbitration: an informal means of dispute resolution that 
“cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding.”3   
 
                                                          
* Acting Professor, University of California, Davis, School of Law (effective July 2012); 
Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles (through July 2012).  Many thanks to 
Michael Helfand.  Thanks also to Marty Rice and the other University of Kansas Law Review editors 
and staff members for their hard work organizing this symposium. 
 1. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 2. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–38 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of 
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid . . . an agreement 
for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 3. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985). 
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Nevertheless, as arbitration matured, the Court reconsidered this 
position.4  Declaring that arbitration did not necessarily affect substantive 
rights, the Court replaced the bright-line non-arbitrability rule with a 
fact-specific test that allows plaintiffs to go to court if they prove that 
they cannot vindicate their federal statutory rights in arbitration.5 
This “vindication of rights” rule—the ghost of the non-arbitrability 
doctrine—has recently become more important.  For one, the Court has 
nearly concluded its slow march toward universal arbitrability.6  Even 
decades after the Court switched to the vindication of rights approach, 
pockets of the non-arbitrability doctrine remained.7  For instance, judges 
refused to grant preclusive effect to an arbitrator’s resolution of civil 
rights claims if an arbitration clause appeared in a collective bargaining 
agreement (as opposed to an individualized employment contract).8  But 
in its 2009 decision 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Court abolished that 
exception.9  As a result, the vindication of rights defense—and not the 
non-arbitrability doctrine—will be the sole limit on the arbitrability of 
statutory claims in most contexts.10 
At the same time, the unconscionability doctrine, a related check on 
drafter overreaching, has come under fire.11  For years, courts could 
                                                          
 4. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (“[W]e have 
recognized that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration . . . .”). 
 5. See id. at 90. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 8. See Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 9. 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009). 
 10. There are other exceptions to the principle of universal arbitrability.  For example, Congress 
can expressly immunize certain claims from the FAA.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006) 
(banning pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts between car manufacturers and dealers); cf. 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669–70 (2012) (holding that Congress did not  
exempt claims under the Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) from the FAA even though the 
CROA requires credit repair companies to inform consumers that they have a “right to sue”).  
Likewise, courts should decline to compel arbitration if there is an “inherent conflict” between the 
FAA and another federal statute.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 
(1987).  For example, some courts have determined that “core proceedings” under the Bankruptcy 
Code are non-arbitrable as inherently conflicting with Congress’s intent to consolidate all matters 
related to a debtor’s insolvency into a single case in bankruptcy court.  See, e.g., In re White 
Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d 164, 169–70 (4th Cir. 2005).  Because these issues arise 
infrequently, however, the vindication of rights doctrine is far and away the most important vestige 
of the non-arbitrability rule. 
 11. See Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2067 (2011) (“[C]ourts applying the unconscionability doctrine to 
arbitration provisions are not acting in a manner consistent with the FAA.”).  For my response to 
Friedman’s excellent article—and more examples of the assault on unconscionability—see David 
Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
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invoke either the vindication of rights rule (a creature of federal common 
law) or the unconscionability defense (a principle of state contract law) 
to invalidate one-sided arbitration clauses.12  This symmetry arose 
because one prong of the unconscionability inquiry—substantive 
unconscionability—centers on the fairness of a specific contractual 
term.13  As a result, if a plaintiff proved that some aspect of an adhesive 
arbitration clause thwarted her federal statutory rights, then a judge could 
find that the clause was unconscionable, violated the vindication of rights 
doctrine, or both.14  The Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion has forced lower courts to untangle the two rules.15  
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California Supreme Court 
opinion that deemed most class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts 
to be unconscionable.16  Yet because the vindication of rights doctrine is 
a matter of federal law, the FAA cannot preempt it.  Thus, after 
Concepcion, the court in Kate’s hypothetical case cannot annul the class 
arbitration waiver on unconscionability grounds,17 but it may be able to 
do so under the vindication of rights rule.  For example, Kate could try to 
persuade the judge that she cannot exercise her federal statutory rights 
without the class action mechanism, either because she seeks to 
aggregate many “negative value” claims (where the litigation costs 
                                                                                                                       
COLLOQUY 13, 13–15 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/17/ 
LRColl2011n17Horton.pdf.  For Friedman’s rejoinder, which takes his initial claim to the next level 
and asserts that unconscionability is not a valid defense to an arbitration clause, see Stephen E. 
Friedman, A Pro-Congress Approach to Arbitration and Unconscionability, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 53, 54 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/19/LRColl 
2011n19Friedman.pdf. 
 12. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (describing how plaintiffs’ 
claims can be analyzed using either approach).  “As a practical matter, there are striking similarities 
between the vindication of statutory rights analysis and the unconscionability analysis.”  Id. 
 13. See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122–23 (Ct. App. 1982) 
(discussing, in part, California’s substantive unconscionability jurisprudence). 
 14. See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 29, 63 (finding several arbitration provisions prevented the 
vindication of plaintiffs’ federal statutory rights and discussing the two methods of analysis). 
 15. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 16. Id. at 1750–51. 
 17. See, e.g., Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., No. SC 91728, 2012 WL 724669, at *7 (Mo. Mar. 
6, 2012) (en banc) (“Concepcion instructs clearly that a court cannot invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on the sole basis that it contains a class waiver.”).  But cf. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, No. 
SC 90647, 2012 WL 716878, at *7 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (en banc) (invalidating entire arbitration 
clause that contained class arbitration waiver on unconscionability grounds). 
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outweigh any individual’s potential damages)18 or because “pattern and 
practice” claims under Title VII require class-wide proof.19 
Despite its budding prominence, the vindication of rights doctrine 
has received little scholarly attention.20  At the highest level of 
generality, the rule is an attempt to facilitate Congress’s intent: 
lawmakers do not want parties to be able to relinquish their federal 
statutory rights at the pre-dispute stage.21  I will call this idea—that 
parties cannot prospectively waive public law claims—the “statutory 
waiver rule.”  The non-arbitrability doctrine once implemented the 
statutory waiver rule by nullifying all pre-dispute contracts to arbitrate 
statutory claims.22  Today, the vindication of rights doctrine inverts that 
approach by requiring forceful proof that a plaintiff cannot effectively 
prosecute her statutory cause of action in arbitration.23  But like the non-
arbitrability doctrine, the vindication of rights rule is simply the tool that 
courts use to enforce the statutory waiver rule: it invalidates arbitration 
provisions that are the functional equivalent of express waivers of federal 
statutory rights.24 
But what explains the statutory waiver rule?  The answer to that 
question has never been clear.  For instance, some federal statutes 
contain express anti-waiver provisions.25  The statutory waiver rule, 
                                                          
 18. See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2012); In re 
Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 667 F.3d 204, 
216 (2d Cir. 2012); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
See generally In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated, Am. 
Express. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
 19. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Chen-Oster I), 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 410 n.7 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 20. For an early attempt to make sense of the Court’s non-arbitrability jurisprudence, see 
Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability 
Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1077 (1987) (arguing that statutory claims should not be 
arbitrable if they seek to vindicate “social end[s] extrinsic to the parties’ direct relationship,” such as 
policies in favor of competitive markets and, presumably, anti-discrimination principles).  As noted 
above, however, the Court has obliterated this distinction and has compelled arbitration of claims 
under statutes that “further important social policies.”  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 27 (1991). 
 21. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 42–60. 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 
(1985) (noting that when “choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a 
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, [the Court] 
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”). 
 25. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006) (Securities Act anti-waiver provision); id. § 77cc(a) (Securities 
Exchange Act anti-waiver provision). 
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however, applies not just to these laws—which Congress has shielded 
from market forces—but to all federal legislation.26  Similarly, it is not 
immediately apparent why lawmakers would wish to forbid parties with 
equal bargaining power from contracting around intrusive, cumbersome 
regulation.  Finally, there is a plausible argument that one-sided 
arbitration clauses are efficient.  In a competitive market, drafters must 
pass their litigation and liability savings back to adherents.  In turn, 
consumers and employees might prefer to have extra money in their 
pockets rather than retain their ability to sue for violation of the public 
laws.27  Thus, the statutory waiver rule’s normative foundation remains 
poorly understood. 
This uncertainty has radiated out into the case law.  Even putting 
aside the nascent class action issue, circuits disagree over how to 
implement the vindication of rights doctrine.  For example, some 
jurisdictions annul cost-splitting clauses if they make arbitration 
prohibitively expensive for a specific plaintiff,28 while others step back 
and consider the effect on other, similarly situated litigants.29  Courts are 
also divided about the validity of pay-your-own-way and loser-pays 
provisions, as well as how to treat after-the-fact efforts by defendants to 
cure prohibitive arbitral costs by offering to reimburse the plaintiff.30  
More generally, the Seventh Circuit has hinted that it does not recognize 
the statutory waiver rule, opining that “the Supreme Court has never held 
that any entitlement is outside the domain of contract.”31 
In this invited contribution to the University of Kansas Law Review’s 
Symposium, Perspectives on the Current State of Arbitration Law, I seek 
to understand this aspect of the federal law of arbitrability by situating it 
within a larger context: the debate over inalienability.  Certain things 
cannot be exchanged for consideration, even if both parties are informed, 
competent, and acting voluntarily.32  For instance, the state will not 
                                                          
 26. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 151–57. 
 28. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555, 557 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
 29. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 100–14. 
 31. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 928 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
 32. Arbitration has long been entangled with various forms of inalienability.  For instance, in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the ouster doctrine forbade parties from contracting around 
the jurisdiction of the courts.  See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.) 532; 1 
Wils. 129 (holding that “the agreement of the parties cannot oust this Court”). 
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honor attempts to sell infants, body parts,33 the power to vote in general 
elections,34 or the need to comply with civic duties such as jury service 
or the military draft.35  These limits on freedom of contract are 
controversial.36  Yet courts and scholars have defended them on several 
grounds.  For instance, inalienability can prevent market failures that 
would result from poor information or negative externalities.37  In 
addition, it can serve as a bulwark against the commodification of 
cherished objects or entitlements. 
I draw on these rationales to bolster the statutory waiver rule and to 
propose several changes to the vindication of rights doctrine.  First, I 
argue that even if one-sided arbitration clauses lower prices and raise 
wages, they are not necessarily socially beneficial.  Not all rights are 
commensurate with money: we value certain entitlements, such as 
freedom from discrimination, differently than we value cash.  Because 
these two things cannot be compared along a common metric, an 
adherent who surrenders her anti-discrimination rights for an increased 
salary is not truly “better off.” 38  As a result, I propose that courts relax 
the vindication of rights burden for anti-discrimination claimants. 
Second, I contend that, in some contexts, the statutory waiver rule 
and the vindication of rights doctrine prevent negative externalities.39  
For example, prospective waivers of antitrust and securities claims harm 
the public by undermining markets and causing the misallocation of 
capital.  In addition, allowing defendants to salvage an otherwise invalid 
arbitration clause by paying a specific plaintiff’s arbitral costs affects 
third parties: it deters future litigants who will be subject to the same 
harsh terms.  At the same time, though, I show how mass contracting 
creates unique problems about what counts as an “externality.” 
Finally, I evaluate the federal law of arbitrability through the lens of 
                                                          
 33. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856 (1987); see 
also Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging “the bedrock 
idea that ‘[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy’ is deeply rooted in 
our nation’s law and public policy” (quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988))), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
 34. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 987–88 (1985); 
Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2000). 
 35. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 931, 967 (1985). 
 36. See Radin, supra note 33, at 1851, 1859–63 (discussing debates regarding the bounds of 
inalienability). 
 37. See id. at 1863–70. 
 38. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 39. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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non-commodification theory: the idea that permitting the sale of a thing 
can change the thing itself.40  At first blush, non-commodification 
analysis, which we normally associate with intensely personal objects or 
entitlements, seems to have little bearing on the pre-dispute inalienability 
of federal statutory rights.  Upon closer inspection, however,  the 
statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine can be seen as 
preserving the distinctive qualities of congressional lawmaking—its 
pedigree and expressive function—in an era where private parties 
exercise legislative-like power.  By creating a safe harbor for Congress’s 
handiwork, these principles maintain a necessary division between 
private and public law.  I argue that courts can further this goal by being 
skeptical of pay-your-own-way and loser-pays provisions: one-sided 
clauses that serve no arbitration-related purpose and thus are bald 
attempts to rewrite the underlying statutory scheme.41 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II traces the development of 
the non-arbitrability doctrine and the vindication of rights rule.  It reveals 
that confusion about the statutory waiver rule—the premise that animates 
both approaches—has made it difficult for judges to apply these 
principles.  Part III uses justifications for inalienability in other contexts 
to illuminate the statutory waiver rule and propose several changes to the 
vindication of rights doctrine. 
II. FROM NON-ARBITRABILITY TO VINDICATION OF RIGHTS 
In this Part, I describe the intersection of the FAA and other federal 
statutes.  I begin with the non-arbitrability doctrine: courts’ initial knee-
jerk assumption that arbitration was incompatible with federal statutory 
rights.  I trace how this jaundiced view evolved into the vindication of 
                                                          
 40. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 41. A perceptive reader will notice that most of the justifications I offer for the rules that 
safeguard against prospective waiver of federal statutory rights apply with equal force to state 
legislation.  Yet it seems unlikely that courts will nullify arbitration clauses on the grounds that they 
prevent a plaintiff from effectively pursuing state statutory claims.  After all, under the Supremacy 
Clause, the FAA—federal substantive law—overrides any conflicting state policy.  See Kilgore v. 
KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 WL 718344, at *13 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012) (finding that the FAA 
preempted a California common law rule that excluded public injunction claims from arbitration 
because “[t]he FAA is ‘the supreme law of the land’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI)); see also AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (“States cannot require a procedure that 
is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”).  But cf. Booker v. Robert 
Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (suggesting that a party may “resist[] arbitration on 
the ground that the terms of an arbitration agreement interfere with the effective vindication of 
[state] statutory rights”). 
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rights doctrine, which requires plaintiffs to marshal concrete proof that 
they cannot effectively prosecute congressionally created rights in 
arbitration.  I reveal that these two principles are actually drastically 
different ways of trying to achieve the same objective: barring parties 
from contracting away their ability to sue for future statutory violations.  
I then show how uncertainty about the policy basis of this premise has 
led to disagreement over the contours of the vindication of rights 
doctrine. 
A. Non-Arbitrability 
The non-arbitrability doctrine first appeared in the Court’s 1953 
decision Wilko v. Swan.42  In that case, the Court refused to compel 
arbitration of an alleged violation of the Securities Act of 1933.43  The 
Securities Act contains two unique components: section 22 gives 
plaintiffs broad discretion to choose a venue and forum,44 and section 14 
invalidates “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision . . . waiv[ing] 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter.”45  The Court 
determined that because the arbitration clause at issue overrode the court-
selection rights bestowed by section 22, it was an impermissible waiver 
under section 14.46  Nevertheless, on the general issue of the 
permissibility of arbitrating statutory claims, Wilko appeared to be at war 
with itself.  At one point, the opinion acknowledged that the FAA serves 
the salutary purpose of “avoiding the delay and expense of litigation,” 
and may be “useful[] . . . in controversies based on statutes.”47  But later, 
the Court implied that the informality of arbitration dilutes the potency of 
the statutory scheme.48  According to the Court, because arbitrators lack 
legal training and need not memorialize their decisions in writing, the 
“effectiveness” of the Securities Act “is lessened in arbitration as 
compared to judicial proceedings.”49 
Lower courts read Wilko broadly.  They saw it as a mandate to strike 
                                                          
 42. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989). 
 43. Id. at 438. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006). 
 45. Id. § 77n. 
 46. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434–35. 
 47. Id. at 431–32. 
 48. See id. at 435. 
 49. Id. at 435–36. 
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down any pre-dispute contract to arbitrate a claim that was “of a 
character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration.”50  For example, 
several circuits refused to compel arbitration of purported violations of 
the Sherman Act.51  Unlike the Securities Act,52 the Sherman Act does 
not feature an anti-waiver provision.  Nevertheless, courts explained that 
the statute serves a societal interest that transcends the parties to any 
deal: 
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter.  The 
Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in a 
competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the 
Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the 
public’s interest.  Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of 
thousands—perhaps millions—of people and inflict staggering 
economic damage.53 
In addition, these judges reasoned that Congress could not have meant to 
entrust antitrust issues to arbitrators, who often worked in the business 
world—the very community the Sherman Act regulates.54 
Yet these concerns—the public interest in the enforcement of statutes 
and the specter of arbitral bias or incompetence—have no limiting 
principle.  Indeed, all federal regulation can be seen as serving vital 
societal functions, and the risk that it might be interpreted by an 
unworthy arbitrator is a hypothesis that cannot be falsified.  Courts thus 
applied the non-arbitrability doctrine to a wide range of other laws.  They 
invalidated pre-dispute contracts to arbitrate claims under the Patent 
Act,55 the Commodity Exchange Act,56 the Railway Labor Act (RLA),57 
                                                          
 50. Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953), rev’d, 346 U.S. 
427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)) 
(“[W]e conclude that the antitrust claims raised here are inappropriate for arbitration.”). 
 51. Id. at 825–27; see also Lake Commc’ns., Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1477–80 (9th 
Cir. 1984); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 162–63 (1st 
Cir. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Univ. Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 
F.2d 846, 850–51 (7th Cir. 1983); Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 
1979); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. Int’l Indus., 438 F.2d 1068, 
1070 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 52. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 53. Am. Safety, 391 F.2d at 826 (citations omitted). 
 54. Id. at 827. 
 55. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976), superseded in part by 
statute, Act of August 27, 1982, ch. 29, § 294, 96 Stat. 317 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 294 
(2006), and overruled in part by Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); 
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,58 the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Practices Act (RICO),59 and the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act.60  Paradoxically, many of these same courts upheld 
contracts to arbitrate existing statutory claims, which they conceptualized 
as a species of settlement agreement.61  They did not attempt to square 
this approach with the reasoning behind the blanket ban they had 
imposed on pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims;62 
indeed, it seemed unlikely that the mere fact a dispute had arisen 
diminished the need for prosecution of the public laws or made 
arbitrators more capable. 
These decisions also suffered from a second flaw: they created 
confusion about the relationship between the non-arbitrability doctrine 
and congressional intent.  For one, it was hard to square the reflexive 
non-arbitrability rule that courts had created with the fact that the FAA’s 
text does not categorically exempt federal statutory claims.  Moreover, 
like the Securities Act at issue in Wilko, some federal laws contain 
express non-waiver provisions.63  But widespread application of the non-
                                                                                                                       
 56. See Breyer v. First Nat’l Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955, 961 (D.N.J. 1982); Bache 
Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French, 425 F. Supp. 1231, 1232–34 (D.D.C. 1977).  But see Smoky Greenhaw 
Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d 1446, 1449 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 57. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
Ruby v. TACA Int’l Airlines, S.A., 439 F.2d 1359, 1364–65 (5th Cir. 1971).  Courts reached these 
results even though the RLA requires parties to submit “disputes over the application or 
interpretation of bargaining agreements . . . to arbitration.”  627 F.2d at 275. 
 58. See DeLancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 1981); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827–29 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 59. See Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 735, 738 (W.D.N.C. 1984); 
Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 567 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 60. See Barrowclough v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir. 1985), overruled 
by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993); Amaro v. 
Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
 61. See Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that 
“claimant is not required to sue” to enforce federal antitrust law and could agree to settle or arbitrate 
after the dispute arose); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 
1970) (finding enforceable only agreements to arbitrate existing antitrust claims, as opposed to 
claims not yet arisen). 
 62. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[W]e agree and hold that there is an 
exception to the rule against arbitration of antitrust issues for cases where an agreement to arbitrate 
is made after a dispute arises . . . .”). 
 63. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.  The Securities Exchange Act also contains 
such a provision.  15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2006) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any 
person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder . . . shall be void.”). 
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arbitrability doctrine made these clauses superfluous; it applied with  
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equal force to statutes that Congress had shielded from private agreement 
and to those that Congress had not. 
Despite this analytical imprecision, the Court continued to invoke the 
non-arbitrability rule.  In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., decided in 
1974, the Court allowed the plaintiff to pursue a Title VII claim against 
his former employer in court, even though his collective bargaining 
agreement contained a broad arbitration provision and an arbitrator had 
ruled that he had been “discharged for just cause.”64  Citing only Wilko, 
the Court announced that “it [is] clear that there can be no prospective 
waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”65  As a result, the Court 
determined that Congress could not have intended alleged violations of 
the civil rights laws to be resolved in a forum where “discovery, 
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath[] are 
often severely limited or unavailable.”66  In 1981, the Court noted similar 
concerns in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., denying 
preclusive effect to an arbitrator’s resolution of an employee’s Fair Labor 
Standards Act claim.67  Three years later, in McDonald v. City of West 
Branch, the Court refused to enforce an arbitrator’s ruling in a § 1983 
case, flatly declaring that arbitration “cannot provide an adequate 
substitute for a judicial trial.”68 
B. Vindication of Rights 
Just one year after McDonald, the Court offered a fundamentally 
different vision of the relationship between the FAA and other federal 
rights.  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the 
Court compelled arbitration of a complex antitrust dispute between a 
Japanese car manufacturer and a Puerto Rican car dealer.69  Although the 
Court noted that arbitration plays a vital role in international 
transactions,70 its reasoning swept far more broadly.  In sharp contrast to  
                                                          
 64. 415 U.S. 36, 42, 59–60 (1974). 
 65. Id. at 51. 
 66. Id. at 57–58. 
 67. 450 U.S. 728, 734 (1981). 
 68. 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984). 
 69. 473 U.S. 614, 616–17, 640 (1985). 
 70. Id. at 629 (“[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities 
of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial 
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ 
agreement . . . .” (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974))). 
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its previous holdings, the Court implied that arbitration was, in fact, 
outcome-neutral: 
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.  It trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.71 
At the same time, the Court clarified that it was not abolishing the 
statutory waiver rule, reasoning that if the arbitration clause acted “as a 
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . . we 
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against 
public policy.”72  Thus, although the Court paved the way for the 
arbitration of federal statutory claims, it declined to give companies carte 
blanche to rewrite the public laws through one-sided arbitration clauses. 
In 1991, the Court continued to retreat from the non-arbitrability 
doctrine in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. by compelling 
arbitration of a claim for wrongful firing under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).73  Although the Court acknowledged that the 
ADEA furthered important policies, it opined that the statute would 
“‘continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function’” as long as 
litigants could “‘vindicate [their] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum.’”74  In a preview of the issues that would later arise under the 
vindication of rights doctrine, the Court then explained why the plaintiff 
would be able to pursue his claim adequately.  The Court noted that the 
New York Stock Exchange arbitral rules, which would govern the 
dispute, “provide[d] protections against biased [arbitral] panels,” 
“allow[ed] for document production, information requests, depositions, 
and subpoenas,” and “require[d] that all arbitration awards be in 
writing.”75  Thus, the Court compelled arbitration only after determining 
                                                          
 71. Id. at 628. 
 72. Id. at 637 n.19.  Shortly afterward, the Court underscored its new framework for gauging 
the arbitrability of public law claims by overruling Wilko and compelling arbitration of asserted 
violations of the Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act, and RICO.  See Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227–31 (1987). 
 73. 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991). 
 74. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637). 
 75. Id. at 30–32. 
HORTON FINAL.doc 8/2/2012  11:30 AM 
736 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
that the plaintiff’s rights would survive the transplant to the extrajudicial 
forum.76 
In 2000, the Court squarely considered the vindication of rights 
doctrine for the first time in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. 
Randolph.77  Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home 
through Green Tree.78  Her loan contained a clause that mandated 
arbitration but said nothing about how the proceeding was to be 
conducted.79  She then filed a class action against Green Tree under the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA).80  When Green Tree moved to compel arbitration, Randolph 
argued that she lacked the resources to arbitrate her claims, citing 
evidence that “arbitration filing fees for claims below $10,000 were 
generally $500 and that the average arbitrator’s fee per day is $700.”81  
The district court ordered the matter to arbitration,82 but the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed.83  The appellate court was troubled by the arbitration 
clause’s silence: 
The arbitration clause in this case raises serious concerns with respect 
to filing fees, arbitrators’ costs and other arbitration expenses that may 
curtail or bar a plaintiff’s access to the arbitral forum . . . . This clause 
says nothing about the payment of filing fees or the apportionment of 
the costs of arbitration.  It neither assigns an initial responsibility for 
filing fees or arbitrators’ costs, nor provides for a waiver in cases of 
financial hardship.  It does not say whether consumers, if they prevail, 
will nonetheless be saddled with fees and costs in excess of any 
award.84 
The Supreme Court reversed.85  It had no quarrel with the general 
proposition that heavy arbitral costs could serve as the basis for annulling 
an arbitration clause.86  The Court, however, determined that Randolph’s 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 26–32. 
 77. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 78. Id. at 82. 
 79. Id. at 82–83 & n.1. 
 80. Id. at 83. 
 81. Brief of Respondent, Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79 (No. 99-1235), 2000 WL 1086800 at *3. 
 82. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1425–26 (M.D. Ala. 1997), rev’d 
sub nom. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 
79 (2000). 
 83. Green Tree, 178 F.3d at 1159. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91–92. 
 86. Id. at 90. 
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argument that she would incur such costs relied on “unfounded 
assumptions.”87  In a critical passage, the Court demanded more of 
plaintiffs with vindication of rights allegations, declaring that “[t]he 
‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too 
speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”88 
After Green Tree, jurisdictions have disagreed about how to assess 
vindication of rights challenges.  One common problem is cost-splitting 
provisions, which usually require plaintiffs to pay half of the arbitral 
expenses.  In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., the 
Fourth Circuit considered the propriety of such a clause.89  The court 
read Green Tree to “suggest[] that some showing of individualized 
prohibitive expense . . . [is] necessary to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement.”90  As a result, the court adopted a test that probes the 
plaintiff’s financial resources—her income, net worth, checking account 
balance, investments, debts, and other obligations—and then considers 
whether the added cost of arbitration (as compared to litigation) will 
deter her.91 
Bradford’s plaintiff-specific approach has been influential in other 
circuits.92  Yet some courts interpret Bradford as erecting a virtually 
insurmountable bar to vindication of rights claims.  For instance, in 
Koridze v. Fannie Mae Corp., a Title VII plaintiff introduced compelling 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 90 n.6. 
 88. Id. at 91–92 (citations omitted).  This theme of judicial non-interference with arbitration 
loomed large over the next few Terms.  In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84–
85 (2002), the Court held that an arbitrator (not a court) should decide whether an arbitral statute of 
limitations barred a claim.  A year later, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 
453–54 (2003), the Court also permitted arbitrators to resolve whether an arbitration clause 
prohibited class arbitration when it was “silent” on the issue.  Finally, in PacifiCare Health Systems, 
Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 (2003), the Court ordered arbitration of RICO claims even though 
the arbitration clause arguably prohibited treble damages that are recoverable under the statute.  
Justice Scalia echoed the Green Tree Court’s rhetoric about not making assumptions as to what 
would occur in arbitration, reasoning that “‘mere speculation’ that an arbitrator might interpret these 
ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their enforceability into doubt” was insufficient to 
entitle the plaintiff to a judicial forum.  Id. at 406–07. 
 89. 238 F.3d 549, 551 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 90. Id. at 557. 
 91. Id. at 556. 
 92. See James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 678–80 (7th Cir. 2005); Musnick v. King 
Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2003); LaPrade v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., Inc., 246 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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evidence of financial hardship.93  In the district court’s own words, she 
proved that 
(i) she is currently unemployed and does not receive income; (ii) her 
husband’s income is roughly $l,500-$2,000 per month after taxes; (iii) 
her monthly expenses—which include a $1,807.32 monthly mortgage 
payment and a $498.75 monthly condominium fee—total 
approximately $3325; (iv) she and her husband have minimal funds in 
their bank accounts and 401(k) plans, and they currently possess 
negligible, if any, equity in their condominium; (v) she and her husband 
are without medical insurance; (vi) she and her husband have one 
minor child, currently are expecting another, and provide economic 
support to her husband’s family in the Republic of Georgia; and (vii) 
neither plaintiff, nor her husband, have sufficient property to serve as 
collateral to obtain a loan to advance arbitration costs.94 
Nevertheless, citing the plaintiff’s educational background and 
employment history, the court held that she had not proven that “she is 
unable to earn sufficient income to advance arbitration costs; rather, she 
has merely established that she currently does not earn such income.”95 
Other courts view the vindication of rights inquiry more broadly.  In 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit criticized 
Bradford’s laser-like focus on individual plaintiffs.96  Morrison noted 
that although Bradford’s approach might provide remedies for aggrieved 
parties in particular cases, it did not do enough to discourage statutory 
violations in the first instance.97  To ensure that public laws continue to 
prevent wrongdoing, Morrison held that judges must evaluate not only 
whether arbitral costs would thwart this particular plaintiff’s claims, “but 
also whether other similarly situated individuals would be deterred . . . as 
well.”98  For instance, in stark contrast to the searching Bradford test, 
                                                          
 93. 593 F. Supp. 2d 863, 864, 869–70 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 94. Id. at 869–70.  The court also noted that the plaintiff had not shown the amount of costs she 
would incur in litigation.  Id. at 870–71. 
 95. Id. at 870. 
 96. 317 F.3d 646, 660 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 97. Id. at 661. 
 98. Id.  Similarly, some district courts in the Second Circuit also ask whether “the cost of 
arbitration may have a ‘chilling effect’ on similarly situated litigants, as opposed to the particular 
effect on the plaintiff in the case.”  EEOC v. Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 448 F. 
Supp. 2d 458, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239–40 
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (examining only whether a plaintiff will likely incur substantial arbitral costs, not 
whether the plaintiff can afford to pay those costs).  But see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust 
Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (adopting Bradford’s approach); Stewart v. Paul, 
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, 201 F. Supp. 2d 291, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); 
Mildworm v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 171, 179–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same).  In addition, the Ninth 
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Morrison invalidated a cost-splitting provision based on nothing more 
than the fact a plaintiff “was employed . . . as a mechanic and as a 
salesperson” and would need to deposit over $1000 with the arbitrator 
before the hearing.99 
Another contentious vindication of rights issue revolves around 
attorneys’ fees.  Arbitration clauses sometimes require each party to pay 
their own legal bills.100  Courts have reached radically different 
conclusions about whether these terms can override federal statutes that 
reward successful plaintiffs by allowing them to recover litigation 
expenses.101  For instance, in Spinetti v. Service Corp. International, the 
Third Circuit struck down a pay-your-own-way provision as an improper 
attempt to alter the fee-shifting regimes of Title VII and the ADEA.102  
Likewise, in the Seventh Circuit case of McCaskill v. SCI Management 
Corp., the fact that an arbitration clause could not preclude an award of 
attorneys’ fees under federal anti-discrimination statutes seemed so 
obvious that the defendant conceded the point at oral argument.103  Yet 
later that same year, the Seventh Circuit opined in Metro East Center for 
Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications International, Inc. that 
there was nothing troubling about an arbitration clause displacing the 
fee-shifting mechanism of a federal telecommunications statute.104  The 
court questioned the soundness of the statutory waiver rule: 
As far as we know, the Supreme Court has never held that any 
entitlement is outside the domain of contract, unless the statute forbids 
waiver . . . . One aspect of personal liberty is the entitlement to 
exchange statutory rights for something valued more highly.  Instead of 
offering a benefit only to a person who is required to arbitrate or 
litigate, a fee-shifting statute may provide a benefit more widely to the 
extent that it changes the terms of trade; the customer sells the  
                                                                                                                       
Circuit has invalidated cost-splitting provisions under the unconscionability doctrine.  See Ferguson 
v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 99. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 676–78. 
 100. See Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 101. See Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 102. Id.; cf. Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 288 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that such a provision was unconscionable when applied to Title VII and state law claims); Herrera v. 
Katz Commc’ns, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (assuming, but not deciding, that 
such a clause would be invalid). 
 103. 298 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 104. 294 F.3d 924, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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entitlement back to the phone company for cash (in the form of lower 
rates).105 
Likewise, jurisdictions have splintered over loser-pays clauses, 
which entitle the prevailing party to recover their attorneys’ fees.  
Several courts have held that these provisions—which mean that 
plaintiffs may end up subsidizing the defense of their own lawsuit—are 
unconscionable.106  Remarkably, however, vindication of rights 
challenges to these clauses generally fail.107  For instance, in Musnick v. 
King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that 
because the plaintiff had not actually proven that he would lose, the risk 
that he would be saddled with the defendant’s legal bills was “too 
‘speculative’ to render [the] agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.”108 
[A]t this point Plaintiff has not been assessed with any fees, nor is it 
certain that he ever will be.  Given these facts, we cannot conclude that 
the arbitration agreement constitutes a barrier to vindication of 
Plaintiff’s rights.  Plaintiff’s speculation about prohibitive costs is just 
that—speculation; this is not enough to invalidate an otherwise 
enforceable arbitration provision.109 
                                                          
 105. Id.  The arbitration clause in Metro East appeared in a tariff filed with the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC); thus, the court ultimately concluded that “only the FCC may 
consider an objection to the tariff’s [arbitration clause].”  Id. at 930.  Similarly, in Faber, the Eighth 
Circuit enforced a provision that required each party to bear its own attorneys’ fees against an 
ADEA claimant, tersely concluding that it was neither “substantively unfair” nor “inimical to the 
public good.” 367 F.3d at 1055. 
 106. Most of these cases involve statutes that allow successful plaintiffs (but not defendants) to 
recover attorneys’ fees.  See, e.g., Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(RICO); Parilla, 368 F.3d at 284 (Title VII); R&L Ltd. Invs., Inc. v. Cabot Inv. Props., LLC, 729 F. 
Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (D. Ariz. 2010) (state securities claims); Walters v. A.A.A. Waterproofing, 
Inc., 211 P.3d 454, 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (state wage claims); cf. Fortune v. Castle Nursing 
Homes, Inc., 843 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (negligence claim against nursing home).  
But see Hopkins v. New Day Fin., 643 F. Supp. 2d 704, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (rejecting 
unconscionability challenge to loser-pays provision when arbitration clause excused compliance 
with the provision if the plaintiffs lacked financial resources); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 
P.3d 156, 162 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting unconscionability challenge to loser-pays clause when 
plaintiff offered no evidence about her financial status or the likely costs of arbitration). 
 107. See Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (quoting Goodman v. ESPE Am., Inc., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 
2001)) (internal quotations omitted).  The court explained that the plaintiff could raise this argument 
after the arbitration had been conducted, noting that courts can vacate arbitral awards for “manifest 
disregard of the law.”  Id. at 1261.  But see James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 680 n.4 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“[Plaintiff] maintains that she cannot afford to pursue arbitration in the first instance.  A 
review of the allocation of costs conducted after the arbitration would be of little help to her.”).  For 
other cases enforcing loser-pays clauses, see Summers v. Dillard’s, Inc., 351 F.3d 1100, 1101 (11th 
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Still another source of confusion is whether extra-contractual 
evidence can impact the vindication of rights analysis.  Defendants 
sometimes attempt to defuse cost-based challenges by promising to pay a 
greater share of the arbitral expenses or waiving problematic aspects of 
the arbitration clause.110  Courts have reacted to this gambit in varying 
ways.111  Again, even judges within the same circuit have voiced 
irreconcilable views.  In its 2003 en banc decision in Morrison v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reasoned that because the vindication 
of rights analysis focuses on whether prospective litigants would be 
deterred—not just the plaintiff in the case at bar—a defendant cannot 
cure a deficient arbitration clause by offering to pay the plaintiff’s 
costs.112  One year later, in Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., another 
Sixth Circuit panel followed Morrison and even noted an additional 
                                                                                                                       
Cir. 2003); Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2002); Am. 
Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 712 (5th Cir. 2002); DeGroff v. MascoTech Forming 
Tech., 179 F. Supp. 2d 896, 910 (N.D. Ind. 2001).  For a decision in which the court rejected an 
unconscionability challenge to a loser-pays clause in a case involving state consumer protection 
statute, see Branco v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1282 (D. Haw. 2005). 
 110. See cases cited infra note 111. 
 111. Compare Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l., 324 F.3d 212, 217 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (“SCI’s offer to 
pay the costs of arbitration upon proof that compelling Spinetti to pay her costs would be 
prohibitively expensive is an after-the-fact offer and will be treated as such.”), and Murray v. United 
Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable as written and Local 400 may not rewrite the arbitration clause and 
adhere to unwritten standards on a case-by-case basis in order to claim that it is an acceptable one.”), 
and Gourley v. Yellow Transp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1205 (D. Colo. 2001) (declining defendant’s 
“invitation to enforce the Arbitration Agreement absent the offending provisions”), and Kinkel v. 
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 259 (Ill. 2006) (“[A] defendant’s after-the-fact offer to pay 
the costs of arbitration should not be allowed to preclude consideration of whether the original 
arbitration clause is unconscionable.”), with Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 
124 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We believe that New York law would allow for the enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement as modified by the defendants’ waivers.”), and Carter v. Countrywide Credit 
Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 300 (5th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that plaintiffs’ “prohibitive costs argument 
has been mooted by Countrywide’s representation to the district court that it would pay all 
arbitration costs”), and Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1029 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“At oral argument before us, Hometown Mortgage’s counsel said the stipulation means her 
client will pay ‘what we need to pay to make it fair for Mr. Anders,’ and the arbitrator will decide 
how much Hometown Mortgage should pay of Anders’ costs.”), and Coup v. Scottsdale Plaza 
Resort, LLC, No. CV-11-931-PHX-LOA, 2011 WL 4625966, at *20 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2011) 
(“[Plaintiffs] do not demonstrate that arbitration will put them in any worse position than litigation in 
allowing them to pursue their claims, especially now that Dawson has unequivocally agreed to pay 
for all arbitration costs and fees.”), and Branco, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (“Plaintiffs argument is 
moot because Defendants have offered to pay whatever fees necessary to find the arbitration 
agreement enforceable.”), and In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 
411–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[D]efendants have offered to pay all arbitration fees, hearing fees, and 
arbitrators’ fees, and to forgo any right to seek prevailing party attorneys’ fees in arbitration.”). 
 112. 317 F.3d 646, 676 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Because the employer drafted the arbitration 
agreement, the employer is saddled with the consequences of the provision as drafted.”). 
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concern: allowing a defendant to ignore the plain language of its own 
contract would give it the power to unilaterally amend the arbitration 
agreement.113  Nevertheless, in 2009, in Mazera v. Varsity Ford 
Management Services, different Sixth Circuit judges enforced an 
arbitration clause—despite finding it “prohibitively expensive”—simply 
because the defendant stated that it “might” waive the requirement that 
the plaintiff pay a $500 deposit.114 
On the flipside of the same issue, it is unclear how other avenues of 
plaintiff funding affect the vindication of rights analysis.  For instance, in 
an insightful article, Christopher Drahozal notes that federal statutory 
claimants are often represented by contingency fee lawyers.115  Drahozal 
argues that because these attorneys usually advance litigation expenses, 
they might cover arbitration costs as well.116  In turn, if many plaintiffs 
do not pay up-front arbitral fees, then their individual finances—
currently the centerpiece of cost-based vindication of rights challenges—
would be far less probative of whether arbitration deters claims.117  In 
fact, as Drahozal notes, the vindication of rights doctrine creates perverse 
incentives for the arbitration-phobic plaintiffs’ bar: “[s]o long as 
attorneys can use the upfront costs of arbitration as a ground for 
challenging an arbitration agreement (enabling their client to bring his or 
her claim in court instead of in arbitration), attorneys have an incentive 
not to finance arbitration costs.”118  Ironically, however, courts generally 
use contingent representation as a one-way ratchet in the opposite  
                                                          
 113. 367 F.3d 493, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2004) (“MRM’s offer was an impermissible attempt to vary 
the terms of a contract.  There was neither a meeting of the minds nor consideration to support such 
a post hoc unilateral amendment of the agreement.”). 
 114. See 565 F.3d 997, 1004–05 (6th Cir. 2009).  This ruling was all the more striking because 
the court did not conclusively determine that the defendant would waive the fee; rather, it only 
“suspect[ed]” that the defendant would “seriously entertain [the plaintiff’s] waiver request.”  Id. at 
1005 (noting also that the defendant’s “counsel stated at oral argument that, although he could not 
predict with certainty how his client would respond to a waiver request, he thought it likely that such 
a request would be granted”). 
 115. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 729, 734–35 (2006). 
 116. Id. (“Arbitration costs are simply another form of expense—like discovery costs, 
investigation costs, expert witness fees, and so on.  Given that lawyers are willing to finance and 
insure against these other sorts of expenses, one would expect the same to be true for arbitration 
costs.”). 
 117. Arguably, however, a plaintiff’s finances might still be relevant; contingency-fee lawyers 
may be less likely to advance arbitral costs if they suspect that unsuccessful plaintiffs will not be 
able to reimburse them. 
 118. Drahozal, supra note 115, at 735. 
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direction: they only mention a plaintiff’s inability to obtain counsel as a 
reason to invalidate an arbitration clause.119 
This link between arbitration and the market for legal representation 
looms especially large for the final (and arguably most important) 
vindication of rights issue—the class arbitration waiver.  For roughly two 
decades, companies have tried to use arbitration as a shield for class 
action liability.120  By placing a class action waiver in an arbitration 
clause, they sought to endow it with the vigorous policy in favor of 
arbitration.121 But starting with the California Supreme Court’s 2005 
decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, thirteen other jurisdictions 
struck down class arbitration waivers as unconscionable when applied to 
numerous low-value causes of action.122  These courts explained that 
                                                          
 119. Compare Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., L.P., 64 A.D.3d 127, 136 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009) 
(reasoning that “out-of-pocket expenses for an employee filing a legal suit are minimal,” partially 
because “attorneys may be likely to take the case on a contingency fee basis”), with id. at 157 
(McGuire, J., dissenting in part) (“Nothing but sheer speculation supports the implicit assumption 
that representation on a contingency fee basis is more likely in litigation than when attorneys 
represent claimants in arbitration.”).  Other courts have similarly cited contingent fees’ purported 
role in access to counsel.  See, e.g., Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., 565 F.3d at 1004 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“Many potential plaintiffs who would otherwise pursue their federal statutory rights in court via a 
contingency-fee arrangement . . . might decline to do so in light of Varsity Ford’s requirement that 
they deposit $500 within 10 days of an unfavorable decision on their grievance by the dealership’s 
president.”); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(noting that most plaintiffs in court “will be represented by attorneys on a contingency-fee basis” but 
ignoring the fact that the same may be true for plaintiffs in arbitration).  For the rare contrary view, 
see Coffey v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. 1:08-CV-2911-JOF, 2009 WL 2515649, at *10 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 1, 2009) (“[T]here is no shortage of attorneys willing to take personal injury claims on a 
contingency fee basis.”). 
 120. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005). 
 121. See id.; Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will 
the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2000). 
 122. 113 P.3d 1100, 1107–08 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 231 n.2, 233 (3d Cir. 2009), 
abrogation recognized by Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011); Lowden v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2008); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 
1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Georgia law); Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 
1285–90 (D. Ariz. 2007); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274–75 (Ill. 2006); 
Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 22–23 (Mo. 2010) (en banc), vacated and 
remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part; No. SC 90647, 2012 WL 716878, at 
*7 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (en banc); Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1222 (N.M. 2008); 
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008); Vasquez-Lopez v. 
Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 948–54 (Or. App. 2007); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 
874, 885–86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), abrogation recognized by Brown v. Trueblue, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-
0514, 2011 WL 5869773, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011); Herron v. Century BMW, 693 S.E.2d 
394, 399–400 (S.C. 2010), aff’d, 693 S.E.2d 394, 398–400 (S.C. 2010), vacated, Sonic Auto., Inc. v. 
Watts, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1007–08 (Wash. 2007) 
(en banc); Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 732, 746–48 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).  
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because these claims will either be prosecuted on a class basis or not at 
all, class arbitration waivers permit drafters to avoid liability.123  In two 
recent blockbuster decisions, however, the U.S. Supreme Court undercut 
this logic.  First, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp., the Court held that class arbitration was improper when an 
arbitration clause was “silent” on the permissibility of such a 
procedure.124  Second, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court 
held that the FAA preempts Discover Bank.125  The Court reasoned that 
the California Supreme Court had used the unconscionability doctrine to 
require drafters to engage in class arbitration, making “the process 
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than 
final judgment.”126  Accordingly, the Court concluded that Discover 
Bank and its progeny “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration and thus create[] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”127 
Although Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion were seen as “the death 
knell” for class actions,128 they may not apply so broadly.  Discover Bank 
and its allied cases invoked contract principles that, like all state law, 
must yield when in conflict with the FAA.  But if a plaintiff asserts 
federal statutory claims, the core insight of these opinions—that class 
arbitration waivers make certain lawsuits unmarketable—can be recast as 
a vindication of rights challenge.  Indeed, before Stolt-Nielsen and 
Concepcion, some courts nullified class arbitration waivers when applied 
to negative-value federal statutory claims on the grounds that “no 
attorney (regardless of competence) would ever take such a case on a 
contingent fee basis.”129  Because the vindication of rights doctrine arises 
                                                                                                                       
Several other courts had already reached similar decisions.  See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker 
Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 
So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278–80 (W. Va. 2002). 
 123. See cases cited supra note 122. 
 124. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to 
class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”). 
 125. 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (“[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover 
Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”). 
 126. Id. at 1751. 
 127. Id. at 1748. 
 128. Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class Actions?, 
WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-
ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions/. 
 129. Caban v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009); see also 
Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (“While the subscribers in the instant 
case do not argue the class action waiver prevents them from vindicating their statutory rights, we 
nonetheless find the First Circuit’s analysis in Kristian instructive.”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 
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from federal common law—and is thus immune from FAA 
preemption—Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion’s impact on these cases 
remains hazy.  On the one hand, as noted above, the vindication of rights 
doctrine is, at bottom, an attempt to square the FAA with other federal 
laws.130  As some defendants have argued, the Court sometimes favors a 
statute with a broad preemptive ambit over other, “lesser” statutes. 131  
Thus, by expanding the domain of the FAA, Stolt-Nielsen and 
Concepcion may have implicitly undercut the vindication of rights 
doctrine.132  Indeed, as one district court put it, thanks to Stolt-Nielsen 
and Concepcion, there is now “considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
precise metes and bounds of the federal common law of arbitrability.”133 
In the Amex litigation, however, the Second Circuit determined that 
judges may still invalidate class arbitration waivers under the vindication 
of rights doctrine.134  In 2009, the appellate court invalidated a class 
arbitration waiver on the grounds that a class of medium-sized merchants 
would not be able to vindicate their complex and expensive antitrust 
claims against American Express on an individual basis.135  In 2010, the 
Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen and subsequently remanded the 
Amex litigation for further consideration.  Undeterred, in 2011, the 
Second Circuit held that the vindication of rights doctrine had survived: 
Stolt-Nielsen states that parties cannot be forced to engage in a class 
arbitration absent a contractual agreement to do so.  It does not follow, 
as Amex urges, that a contractual clause barring class arbitration is per 
se enforceable.  Indeed, our prior holding focused not on whether the 
                                                                                                                       
F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that class arbitration waiver impaired plaintiffs’ ability to bring 
antitrust claims where expert fees would costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, but each plaintiff’s 
recovery “will range from a few hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars at most”); cf. In re Cotton 
Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have acknowledged that if a party 
could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively 
expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement.”). 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
 131. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Chen-Oster II), No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 
2011 WL 2671813, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (discussing and rejecting defendants’ argument 
that federal courts often look to preemption jurisprudence when harmonizing statutes). 
 132. See D’Antuono v. Serv. Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 339 (D. Conn. 2011) (“[T]he 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in [Concepcion] only implicated federal preemption of a 
particular state law rule.  But [we] know[] of no principled reason why federal law rules that have 
essentially the same purpose and effect as the Discover Bank rule would continue to be permissible 
after [Concepcion].”). 
 133.  Id. at 331. 
 134. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated, Am. 
Express. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
 135. Id. at 304. 
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plaintiffs’ contract provides for class arbitration, but on whether the 
class action waiver is enforceable when it would effectively strip 
plaintiffs of their ability to prosecute alleged antitrust violations.136 
Then, later that year, the Supreme Court decided Concepcion, prompting 
the Second Circuit to revisit the matter yet again.  And, once more, the 
appellate panel stuck to its guns.  Affirming its previous holdings, it 
announced in 2012 that the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence did not 
affect the vindication of rights inquiry, reasoning that “[n]either Stolt-
Nielsen nor Concepcion overrules Mitsubishi, and neither makes mention 
of Green Tree.”137  Thus, it appears that the vindication of rights doctrine 
has supplanted unconscionability as the primary means for courts to 
strike down class arbitration waivers.138 
In sum, courts once exempted all federal statutory claims from the 
FAA’s ambit; now, they compel arbitration of those claims unless a 
plaintiff proves that doing so will thwart her rights.  The now-obsolete 
non-arbitrability rule and its predecessor, the vindication of rights 
doctrine, serve a common goal: preventing parties from prospectively 
relinquishing congressionally given rights.  In turn, the policy basis of 
this objective has always been elusive.  As a result, courts have 
implemented the vindication of rights doctrine inconsistently.  In the next 
Part, I draw on inalienability theory to flesh out the statutory waiver rule 
and recalibrate the vindication of rights doctrine. 
                                                          
 136. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 
667 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 137. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2012).  Similarly, 
in Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Chen-Oster II), No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 
2671813, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011), the Southern District of New York declined to submit a 
pattern or practice employment discrimination claim under Title VII to arbitration.  The court noted 
that these unique causes of action “may not be brought by a single individual, but rather must be 
pursued by a class.”  Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Chen-Oster I), 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).  Thus, the court read Concepcion not to foreclose it from allowing a class action to 
proceed when necessary to permit plaintiffs to “enforc[e] their statutory rights.”  Chen-Oster II, 2011 
WL 2671813, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Amex II, 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 
2011)) (refusing to grant motion for reconsideration of court’s original holding in light of 
Concepcion); see also Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2248, 2011 WL 5881926, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (noting that Concepcion does “not alter the validity of the federal statutory 
rights analysis articulated in Mitsubishi [and] Green Tree”). 
 138. Then again, as this Article was going to press, the Missouri Supreme Court nullified a class 
arbitration waiver by finding that the entire arbitration clause in which it appeared was “extremely 
one-sided” and thus unconscionable.  See Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, No. SC 90647, 2012 WL 
716878, at *7 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012).  Time will tell whether other courts also attempt to end-run 
Concepcion in this manner. 
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III. THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND INALIENABILITY 
The statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine are 
anomalies.  In a society committed to the notion that unfettered exchange 
will shepherd an asset to its best use, inalienability is an “analytic 
stepchild”—an “obviously inefficient constraint[] on market trades.”139  
Nevertheless, economists concede that inalienability can prevent market 
failure caused by imperfect information, avoid negative externalities, and 
encourage positive externalities.140  In addition, a rich non-
instrumentalist literature has argued that inalienability is necessary to 
prevent the commodification of certain sacred things.  In this Part, I bring 
these perspectives to bear on the statutory waiver rule and the vindication 
of rights doctrine. 
A. Imperfect Information 
Inalienability can prevent market failure that would otherwise occur 
because of informational defects.141  Indeed, the main utilitarian 
justification for enforcing promises—that parties know which deals will 
make them better off—does not apply if one party lacks the knowledge 
necessary to make such an assessment.142  Of course, no one ever 
possesses perfect information,143 and most misunderstandings do not 
warrant state intervention.144  Nevertheless, because informational flaws 
are a well-accepted source of market failure, commentators sometimes 
cite them as reason to adopt an inalienability rule.145  For example, 
                                                          
 139. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 931; see Radin, supra note 33, at 1851 (noting the 
commonly held view that “inalienable property rights are exceptional and problematic”). 
 140. See Radin, supra note 33, at 1863 (stating that “inalienability is a means of controlling 
externalities that prevent the market from achieving an efficient result”). 
 141. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 939 (stating that because “markets also frequently 
work poorly because information is imperfect,” market failure due to informational defects provides 
a rationale for inalienability rules”). 
 142. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 102–03 (1993) 
(noting that “if at least one party inaccurately perceives or evaluates the impact of the exchange on 
her utility, we can no longer be confident that [it] will in fact render both parties better off”). 
 143. See id. at 103 (stating that “[a]lmost no exchanges are entered into with absolutely perfect 
information by both parties”). 
 144. See id. (“Even the purchase of the morning newspaper . . . on the assumption that it will 
contain an interesting film or restaurant review, when this assumption turns out to be false, reflects 
an exchange entered into with incomplete information.”). 
 145. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 732 
(2005) (discussing Rose-Ackerman’s imperfect information explanation for a modified inalienability 
rule); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
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consumer, employment, and landlord–tenant law is littered with non-
disclaimable rights and duties, from usury laws to warranties of 
habitability.146  These rules protect vulnerable parties from harsh terms 
that they likely do not understand. 
The statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine may 
serve a similar purpose.  After all, because of the widespread belief that 
adherents ignore dispute resolution terms in standard form contracts, 
there has been a long debate among legal academics about informational 
asymmetries and arbitration.147  For instance, in a groundbreaking 
critique of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, David Schwartz claims that 
the statutory waiver rule levels the informational playing field between 
drafters and adherents.148 
When a party to a contract waives her rights to recover for future harm, 
particularly when this waiver is unilateral (as it typically is), strong 
reason exists to believe that some combination of unequal bargaining 
power and information underlies the agreement.  In certain common 
adhesion contract situations, the weaker or adhering party is likely to be 
relatively uninformed about the likelihood or degree of potential harm 
for which she is waiving future remedies, and to underestimate the 
value of the rights forfeited.149 
                                                                                                                       
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972) (citing instances where external 
costs, such as freeloader and informational costs, make limitations on the ability to engage in 
transactions more efficient); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 946–47 (stating that modified 
inalienability could be a response to quality control problems created by markets with imperfect 
information). 
 146. See Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a 
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 207–09 (1998) 
(collecting examples). 
 147. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 710, 
765–66; David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 57 (1997); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 757, 798 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 637, 676–77 (1996); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1997).  More broadly, scholars have asserted that it may be irrational for 
adherents to spend the time and energy necessary to understand standard form terms.  See Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243–44 
(1995). 
 148. Schwartz, supra note 147, at 114. 
 149. Id.; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and 
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 413 (2006) 
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Although Schwartz was writing before the emergence of the vindication 
of rights doctrine, his argument applies with greater force to that 
arbitration-specific principle.  The statutory waiver rule governs express 
waivers of public law rights.150  If a party cannot appreciate the gravity of 
such a clause, then she is even less likely to understand the effect of a 
one-sided arbitration provision that implicitly achieves the same result.  
Arguably, then, there are reasons to be especially concerned about 
informational defects at the crossroads of public law and arbitration. 
Law and economics aficionados, however, have not been persuaded.  
Even if consumers and employees systemically undervalue their federal 
statutory rights, it does not necessarily follow that the market for these 
rights will malfunction.151  Assume that an elite group of adherents 
actively seeks optimal terms: either “fair” arbitration clauses or “unfair” 
provisions that are accompanied by price reductions or higher wages.  In 
a competitive market, drafters will need to cater to these “shoppers” to 
stay in business.152  But because drafters cannot distinguish shoppers 
from the masses, they must offer one set of terms for all their customers.  
As a result, if shoppers’ preferences are majoritarian—if they dovetail 
with what most consumers and employees want—then drafters will offer 
efficient arbitration clauses.153  Now suppose that the informational 
critique of arbitration is exactly right: nobody reads the fine print, or 
searches for ideal arbitration clauses, or is even capable of detecting a 
link between a harsh provision and other, more-favorable terms.  The 
market will push drafters in one direction: they will offer unfair 
arbitration clauses along with lower prices and higher wages.154  After 
all, if adherents ignore dispute resolution terms, then they undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                       
(arguing that adherents overlook the significance of “waiv[ing] rights that will become operative 
only upon the occurrence of a future event that is remote, uncertain, and often undesirable”). 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
 151. See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 
1053, 1072 n.39 (1977) (noting that customers have no problems finding other sellers). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: 
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389–92 (1983) 
(analyzing the effect of consumer searching on the generation of optimal prices for all consumers); 
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 637–38 (1979) (same). 
 154. Cf. Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 760–61 
(2011) (discussing how drafting parties allocate costs and gains between “salient terms” and “non-
salient boilerplate”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1212–16 (2003) (discussing how customers may place 
different values on price and warranty contract terms). 
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focus on price and wages, forcing drafters to compete on that level.155  
This will hold true no matter whether adherents “understand, or even 
notice, the arbitration clause”;156 indeed, it follows from the simple fact 
that “whatever lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower 
prices” and raise wages.157  Now, admittedly, we cannot be sure that this 
outcome is efficient: whether most adherents actually prefer fair terms or 
unfair terms with lower prices and higher wages is probably an 
unanswerable empirical question.  Then again, if policymakers must 
guess, the idea that fully informed consumers and employees would 
rather have money in their pocket than retain the full rainbow of federal 
statutory rights seems plausible. 
In addition, even for those who are less sanguine about the free 
market, there is another problem with linking the statutory waiver rule 
and the vindication of rights doctrine to informational flaws: the 
unconscionability doctrine does a better job at covering this terrain.  To 
be sure, the federal law of arbitrability and unconscionability will always 
overlap.  As noted above, the fact that a one-sided arbitration clause 
dilutes the plaintiff’s rights can serve as the springboard for either a 
vindication of rights or an unconscionability challenge.158  Technically, 
however, unconscionability is a superior tool for smoking out 
informational flaws.  Indeed, the test for procedural unconscionability 
hinges on “overwhelming bargaining strength or use of fine print or 
incomprehensible legalese”159 and, thus, isolates terms that adherents are 
likely to ignore or misunderstand.  Conversely, the statutory waiver rule 
and the vindication of rights doctrine govern all parties (even 
corporations) and all contracts (including negotiated deals). 
For example, the Court first endorsed the statutory waiver rule and 
the vindication of rights doctrine in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a dispute between two companies.160  And as 
noted above, in the Amex litigation, the Second Circuit allowed a group 
                                                          
 155. See sources cited supra note 153. 
 156. Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 92. 
 157. Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With 
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 255–56 (2006); 
see also IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“As long as the market is competitive, sellers must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable; 
onerous terms just lead to lower prices.”). 
 158. E.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 159. 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2010). 
 160. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
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of medium-sized businesses to prove that they could not vindicate their 
antitrust rights without the class action device.161  The court took pains to 
point out that it “in no way rel[ied] on the status of plaintiffs as ‘small’ 
merchants.”162  Of course, even these examples—like many business-to-
business transactions—can take the form of preprinted agreements 
foisted by a more “powerful” party upon another.163  Yet outside of the 
consumer and employment settings, courts are much less concerned 
about informational defects and generally invalidate provisions only for 
outright fraud, duress, or mistake.164   
Despite all this, there is a narrow way in which the statutory waiver 
rule and the vindication of rights doctrine dovetail with information-
based theories of inalienability.  Suppose the law and economic critique 
of standard form contracts is exactly right.  It simply establishes that one-
sided arbitration provisions save adherents money.  But not all rights are 
commensurate with cash.  As Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed 
note in their celebrated article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, some entitlements simply “do 
not lend themselves to collective measurement which is acceptably 
objective and nonarbitrary.”165  This is a broader kind of information 
problem: it is not that the hustle of the contracting process prevents 
                                                          
 161. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) , rev’d, 667 
F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 162. Id.  When the Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in light of Concepcion, it repeated this 
point verbatim.  See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Our decision in no way relies upon the status of plaintiffs as ‘small’ merchants.  We rely instead 
on the need for plaintiffs to have the opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights.”).  On the other 
hand, at least one court has declared that the vindication of rights doctrine “is premised on the 
contractual defense of adhesion.”  EEOC v. Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 448 F. 
Supp. 2d 458, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 163. See, e.g., Amex II, 634 F.3d at 189–90 (describing the agreement all merchants must enter 
as a condition for accepting American Express credit cards in their transactions). 
 164. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 151 
(2005) (“[C]ourts and commentators often ignore bargaining power issues relating to parties outside 
stereotypically ‘weak’ categories.”). 
 165. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 145, at 1111.  Admittedly, Calabresi and Melamed make 
this point in a different context: the difficulty of quantifying negative externalities (costs to third 
parties).  See id. at 1111–12. 
If Taney is allowed to sell himself into slavery, or to take undue risks of becoming 
penniless, or to sell a kidney, Marshall may be harmed, simply because Marshall is a 
sensitive man who is made unhappy by seeing slaves, paupers, or persons who die 
because they have sold a kidney. 
Id. at 1112.  I discuss negative externalities in Part III.B.  Yet the incommensurability of certain 
rights is not limited to the context of negative externalities; rather, it can undermine our confidence 
that the contracting parties will enter into deals that will actually make them better off. 
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parties from properly valuing their rights, but that certain rights cannot 
be properly valued under any circumstances.  For instance, the victim of 
a debilitating tort might recover damages, but she can never truly be 
compensated for her injuries.  Bodily integrity is not fungible; it cannot 
be neatly packaged, weighed, and priced.166  Similarly, consider 
workplace discrimination.  Most people could probably name a sum for 
which they would agree to permit their employer to punish them for their 
immutable characteristics.  It is tempting to think that such an exchange 
would improve their wealth, utility, or happiness.  Yet that conclusion 
ignores the singularity of what it means to be treated with dignity.  We 
value freedom from bias differently than we value cash.167  Because these 
two things cannot be reduced to a common metric and compared, it is not 
entirely accurate to say the transaction makes one better off, worse off, or 
the same.168 
The incommensurability critique reveals a simple way that courts 
could improve the vindication of rights doctrine: by linking the intensity 
of judicial review to the specific federal statute at issue.  Currently, when 
courts decide whether an arbitration clause thwarts a plaintiff’s rights, 
they apply a single, fixed standard that does not fluctuate with the nature 
of the plaintiff’s claim.  For instance, as discussed above, many 
jurisdictions require plaintiffs to introduce concrete, compelling evidence 
that they are priced out of arbitration—no matter whether the plaintiff 
alleges violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) or Title VII.169  
This one-size-fits-all approach glosses over the fact that TILA and Title 
VII serve fundamentally different purposes: the former protects against 
financial loss while the latter safeguards civil rights that are 
                                                          
 166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1977) (“The sensations caused by 
harm to the body or by pain or humiliation are not in any way analogous to a pecuniary loss, and a 
sum of money is not the equivalent of peace of mind.”). 
 167. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
784 (1994) (“Different kinds of valuation cannot without significant loss be reduced to a single 
‘superconcept,’ like happiness, utility, or pleasure.”). 
 168. Perhaps for this reason, courts seem more confident that civil rights, rather than other 
entitlements, are inalienable.  See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617 (9th Cir. 
1988) (“Allowing the waiver of Title VII rights through covenants in employment contracts would 
undermine Title VII’s policy of eradicating discrimination in employment.”); Heurtebise v. Reliable 
Bus. Computers, 550 N.W.2d 243, 257 (Mich. 1996) (“[A]n employee’s substantive civil rights are 
not for sale.”); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 64 (1991) (“[T]here are some things workers 
shouldn’t be forced to bargain about—like an employer’s demand that he or she endure racial or 
sexual subordination . . . .”). 
 169. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
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incommensurable with money.170  It makes sense to conclude that most 
plaintiffs would prefer to have extra cash up front than retain their TILA 
rights.  But as I have argued, it does not follow that anyone is better off 
when they earn more but suffer discrimination.  Relaxing the vindication 
of rights burden for anti-discrimination plaintiffs—requiring less proof 
that arbitration thwarts their rights—could accommodate this concern. 
In sum, courts often employ the vindication of rights doctrine in 
situations that involve information imbalances.  Yet in this context—one-
sided arbitration clauses in consumer, franchise, and employment 
contracts—the vindication of rights doctrine adds nothing to the 
unconscionability defense.  Moreover, because the vindication of rights 
doctrine also governs brokered deals between relative equals, it does not 
seem like a response to imperfect information.171  Nevertheless, I have 
argued that the rule can be justified on the grounds that some federal 
statutes protect rights that are incommensurable with money.  I now 
consider a related possibility: that the doctrine is animated by the need to 
prohibit negative externalities or encourage positive externalities. 
B. Externalities 
Inalienability can also prevent negative externalities (costs imposed 
by the transacting parties on third parties) or facilitate positive 
externalities (benefits conferred by the contracting parties on third 
parties).172  In this Part, I argue that prospective waivers of some federal 
statutory rights cause negative externalities.  Yet I also show that the 
relationship between federal arbitrability principles and externalities is 
more complex than some courts and scholars have assumed. 
To understand the concept of negative externalities, consider a 
simple example: a landowner is deciding whether to sell a parcel in a 
residential area to a notorious polluter who intends to build a factory on 
the site.173  Even if the polluter is the high bidder, this may not be an 
efficient result.  For instance, the detriment to the neighbors may 
                                                          
 170. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (identifying Congress’s intent to protect consumers in credit 
transactions under TILA); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) (identifying “the 
important purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where 
race is not a barrier to opportunity”). 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 160–62. 
 172. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 145, at 1089; Radin, supra note 33, at 1863; 
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 938. 
 173. Cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 938–39 (using a similar example). 
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outweigh the value of the transaction to the putative contractors.  As a 
result, the neighbors have incentives to band together and offer a higher 
price than the polluter.  Yet this result depends on collective action, 
which is unlikely.  Without a way to prevent free-riding, not every 
affected neighbor will pitch in.  Thus, the only way to achieve the best 
result may be to restrict the way the land can be sold or exploited.174 
Long before arbitration became pervasive, courts purported to apply 
the statutory waiver rule to avoid negative externalities (although they 
did not use the phrase “negative externalities”).  For instance, in Fox 
Midwest Theatres v. Means, decided in 1955, the Eighth Circuit held that 
a settlement agreement could not absolve film producers from liability 
for future antitrust violations.175  Because antitrust laws are vital to 
preserving competitive markets, the court reasoned that such a release 
“would have impact, not simply between the parties, but upon the public 
as well.”176  More recently, in Cange v. Stotler & Co., the Seventh 
Circuit opined that a prospective waiver of rights under the Commodity 
Exchange Act would be invalid “[b]ecause Congress viewed [the statute] 
as ‘critical to protecting the public and . . . maintaining the credibility of 
the futures market.’”177  By seeking to prevent harm to parties outside of 
the contractual relationship, these courts attempted to avoid negative 
externalities. 
Likewise, judges and scholars sometimes link the vindication of 
rights doctrine to negative externalities.  For instance, David Schwartz 
has argued that robust judicial review of one-sided arbitration provisions 
prevents “harm to persons affected by, but not party to, the contract.”178  
According to Schwartz, enforcing arbitration clauses that are the 
                                                          
 174. See id. 
 175. 221 F.2d 173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955). 
 176. Id.  Antitrust cases feature an additional component that may make them sui generis.  The 
Sherman Act prohibits contracts “in restraint of trade.”  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  Arguably, then, a 
settlement, release, or arbitration agreement that waives liability for future violations of the Sherman 
Act is itself a “contract ‘in restraint of trade.’”  Fox Midwest Theatres, 221 F.2d at 180.  Perhaps for 
this reason, courts seem to apply the statutory waiver rule vigorously in the antitrust context.  See, 
e.g., Redel’s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco 
Bd. of Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1967). 
 177. 826 F.2d 581, 595 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 56–57, reprinted 
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3905–06)).  But see id. at 596 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Private 
bargains are subject to attack if enforcement would do too much damage to the statutory system, but 
this is rare and not a ground to refuse to enforce contracts generally . . . . Contracts rarely defeat the 
function of the statute so utterly that they may be set aside.”). 
 178. Schwartz, supra note 147, at 114. 
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functional equivalent of waivers of statutory rights would lead to a kind 
of private race to the bottom.179 
Because employment agreements, for example, are patterned and 
repetitive, a prospective waiver provision in an employment contract 
will not be an isolated event between an employer and a single 
employee, but will tend to be standardized.  If employers presented 
prospective waivers of Title VII rights as part of “take it or leave it” 
agreements and turned away prospective employees who refused to 
sign the provision on the assumption that they could always find 
someone else who will sign, then the price of discrimination decreases.  
This occurs because prospective employees, in effect, “underbid” 
competing job applicants when they willingly devalue their right to 
statutory protection from discrimination.180 
Similarly, recall that in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Sixth 
Circuit broke ranks with other courts and held that cost-splitting 
provisions violate the vindication of rights doctrine when they erode the 
“deterrent effect” of federal law.181  The court’s preoccupation with the 
public interest in the enforcement of federal statutes is a direct 
descendant of the anti-negative externality reasoning in Fox Midwest 
Theatres.182 
As these decisions suggest, many federal statutes do, in fact, have 
significant public dimensions; thus, prospective waivers of claims under 
these laws impose costs on third parties.  Antitrust regulation, for 
example, ensures that markets remain competitive; in turn, because 
commercial niches are tightly entwined, collusion in one industry very 
well might spill over and impact another industry.  Likewise, securities 
fraud arguably “reduces investors’ confidence in the economy; creates 
inaccurate pricing signals, facilitating the misallocation of capital; and 
reduces the efficiency of incentive structures that govern, for example, 
takeovers and executive compensation.”183  Thus, in these contexts, the 
statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine can be 
justified on instrumentalist grounds. 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 114–16. 
 180. Id. at 115–16; see also Estlund, supra note 149, at 412 (arguing that one-sided arbitration 
clauses “compromis[e] the public interest in enforcing the substantive . . . rights at issue”). 
 181. 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 176. 
 183. Robert Allen, Comment, Securities Litigation as a Coordination Problem, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 475, 493 (2009). 
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In addition, the need to avoid negative externalities explains why 
some courts have refused to allow defendants to cure onerous arbitration 
clauses by waiving harsh terms or paying the plaintiff’s costs.184  
Suppose Barry and Carla work at Company A, and their employment 
contracts contain an arbitration clause that requires them to pay a $1000 
deposit.  Barry sues Company A and proves that he cannot afford the 
deposit.  If a judge strikes down the clause, Company A will reduce or 
eliminate the deposit requirement.185  But if a judge simply permits 
Company A to pay Barry’s deposit, Company A’s rights-thwarting 
arbitration clause will remain in effect.  In turn, this transaction between 
Barry and Company A will harm Carla, who will not be able to bring a 
claim against Company A without overcoming a substantial initial 
roadblock.  Prohibiting these deals between litigants and drafters thus 
prevents spillover costs. 
In other contexts, however, it is not clear that the statutory waiver 
rule and the vindication of rights doctrine prevent negative externalities.  
When courts and scholars speak of the vindication of rights doctrine 
maintaining “the deterrent functions” of federal laws,186 they are often 
protecting other signatories to the same contract (not third parties).  
Return to the hypothetical situation above with Company A’s $1000 
arbitral deposit.  If this provision means that Barry is less likely to pursue 
an employment discrimination claim against Company A, then it also 
means that Susan, a supervisor at Company A, may be more prone to 
engage in wrongdoing.  But to cause a negative externality—to inflict 
harm on others—the cost-splitting provision would need to make other 
companies more likely to discriminate.  It does not.  Companies B, C, 
and D’s incentives to prevent discrimination have nothing to do with 
Company A’s employment contract. 
True, if Susan is more likely to discriminate against Barry, then she 
is more likely to discriminate against Carla.  In that sense, the cost-
splitting provision in Barry’s contract does affect non-signatories: his co-
workers.  But these individuals are often locked into the same cost-
splitting provision.  Recall the argument that one-sided arbitration 
clauses allow drafters to pay their employees more.187  If this is true, then 
                                                          
 184. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
 185. See generally David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010) (discussing the frequency with which companies have 
amended their arbitration provisions in response to judicial rulings). 
 186. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 661. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 151–57. 
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Carla is not a passive “third party” with respect to the cost-splitting 
provision in Barry’s contract.  She is not like a landowner who gains 
nothing from the construction of a nearby factory.  Instead, she has 
already reaped the benefits of Barry’s cost-splitting provision in the form 
of higher wages.  Like all Company A employees, she internalizes not 
just the burdens—but also the advantages—of the same mass contract.  
For this reason, it is not clear that cost-splitting clause causes negative 
externalities. 
This slippery issue often surfaces in cases involving class arbitration 
waivers.188  Recall that the main objection to these provisions is that they 
shield the drafter from numerous low-value claims: no consumer will 
pursue, say, a $5 overcharge claim against a bank unless she can do so on 
a class basis.189  As a result, class arbitration waivers eliminate the 
specter of aggregate liability and allow companies to flout the law.190  
Yet under the law and economics view of adhesion contracts, this self-
deregulation permits firms to charge their consumers less and pay their 
employees more.  It may be objectionable for many reasons, but it is 
difficult to classify as a negative externality. 
The briefing in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion illustrates that the 
defense bar has recognized the mutability of cost–benefit calculation in 
the context of mass contracting.191  AT&T laced its class arbitration 
waiver with bounties for plaintiffs who arbitrated on an individual basis, 
promising to pay $7500 and double attorneys’ fees to any such plaintiff 
who recovered more than its last written settlement offer.192  A California 
district court and the Ninth Circuit invalidated the clause, reasoning that 
even if it made individual plaintiffs whole, few consumers would sue, 
and the clause would slash AT&T’s liability.193  In its merits brief at the 
Supreme Court, AT&T attacked this logic.  According to AT&T, the 
courts below improperly considered the costs that the waiver imposed 
“on non-parties to the litigation”—the millions of consumers who would 
never even learn that AT&T had committed wrongdoing without the 
class action device—rather than focusing narrowly on the 
Concepcions.194  But in a spectacular whipsaw, AT&T’s amici accused 
                                                          
 188. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 120–23. 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 120–23. 
 191. 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 192. Id. at 1744. 
 193. Id. at 1745. 
 194. Brief for Petitioner at 36, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893). 
HORTON FINAL.doc 8/2/2012  11:30 AM 
758 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
the lower courts of the opposite sin: not crediting the fact that the waiver 
benefitted all AT&T customers by lowering the “price[] of goods and 
services.”195  Together, the briefs exploited the feedback loop at the 
intersection of adhesion contracts and negative externalities: costs 
imposed on other signatories to the same mass contract are not costs at 
all; in fact, they are benefits. 
 In addition to preventing negative externalities, inalienability can 
also steer owners toward using property in a socially advantageous 
manner.  Susan Rose-Ackerman cites the nineteenth century 
Homesteading Acts as an example of this phenomenon.196  The 
Homesteading Acts allowed settlers to purchase frontier land at a heavy 
discount after they had worked it for five years.197  These statutes forbade 
settlers from selling their plots during this initial period—a restriction 
that guaranteed that the land would, in fact, be farmed.198  Although this 
mandate removed a stick from the bundle of rights, it also made each 
bundle more robust: the value of a particular tract increased as each 
surrounding tract was cultivated.199  Thus, the Homesteading Acts are 
examples of “network effects”: the phenomenon that certain things 
become more valuable when they are widely and uniformly used.200  The 
classic example of a network effect is a telephone, which is worthless 
unless many other people also own telephones.201  In some situations, 
such as the Homesteading Acts, the state can only reap the positive 
externality of network benefits if it first restricts property rights.202 
Similarly, prohibiting parties from waiving future public law causes 
of action generates a positive externality: case law.  Precedent is a 
network benefit—a steady diet of reported opinions makes courts and 
                                                          
 195. Brief for DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
11, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893). 
 196. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 957–59. 
 197. Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (repealed 1976); Homestead Act of 
1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976). 
 198. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 958. 
 199. See Abramowicz, supra note 145, at 733 n.156 (explaining that as each tract was settled, 
neighbors enjoyed “assistance in emergencies, sharing of labor and equipment, and population 
concentration that permitted greater political and economic power”). 
 200. See id. at 732–33. 
 201. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 725 n.31 (1997). 
 202. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 958 (suggesting that the benefits of network effects 
will accrue if states “impose a conditionally coercive entitlement rule designed to encourage 
settlement”). 
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lawyers more dexterous with legal concepts and fact patterns.203  Because 
this information makes it easier for plaintiffs with righteous claims to 
prevail, it increases the value of those claims.  Moreover, precedent 
allows voters, regulators, and lawmakers to monitor the development of 
the public laws.  For instance, Kevin E. Davis and Helen Hershkoff 
argue that contract procedure—the alteration of procedural rules by 
private agreement—reduces governmental transparency.204  They provide 
a specific example in the context of provisions that limit discovery: 
[A] large body of literature emphasizes the importance of full discovery 
to judicial decisions in such areas of the law as employment 
discrimination and consumer protection, in which claims, legal 
theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be developed without a rich 
factual base.  Similarly, commentators point to the relevance of tort 
actions for improving federal agency policymaking by encouraging the 
disclosure of information.  In other words, certain forms of contract 
procedure may reduce the quality and effectiveness of regulation, a 
significant potential social cost.205 
Although Davis and Hershkoff limit their discussion to contractual terms 
that alter procedural rules in court (rather than in arbitration),206 one 
might attempt to use their analysis to support a positive externality-based 
justification for the statutory waiver rule.  Without the doctrine, far fewer 
statutory disputes would reach the courts, shielding Congress’s 
handiwork from the public eye. 
Then again, precedent requires litigation, and litigation has a dark 
side: it soaks up the resources of parties and courts.  Rightly or wrongly, 
our civil justice system has decided that these social costs dwarf the 
                                                          
 203. Cf. David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 437, 479 (2009) (discussing the network benefits of standardized form 
contracts); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 761 (1995) (same); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: 
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1594–95 
(1998) (same).  Standardized contract terms “mak[e] lawyers and other providers of legal services 
more facile in drafting, negotiating, interpreting, and, if need be, litigating the term.”  Korobkin, 
supra, at 1595. 
 204. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
507, 544–46 (2012). 
 205. Id. at 545–46.  Conversely, other commentators have claimed that parties should have wide 
leeway to modify the rules of litigation.  See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case 
for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2007); Henry S. Noyes, 
If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s 
Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 646 (2007). 
 206. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 204, at 552 (calling arbitration a “more radical form[] of 
exit” from “the public rules of procedure”). 
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benefits of precedent.  For instance, we strongly encourage settlement, 
despite the fact that it stunts the flow of judicial decisions.207  Likewise, 
the Supreme Court’s “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”208 
reflects a policy determination that the speed and informality of 
extrajudicial dispute resolution outweigh the virtues of reported opinions.  
Given this backdrop, it would be anomalous if the main purpose of the 
statutory waiver rule was to shunt disputes into litigation.  These factors 
may explain why Davis and Hershkoff limit their paper to contractually 
modified litigation rules in court.209  Both arbitration and privately 
tailored court processes distort the signals that voters and lawmakers 
receive about the substantive law.210  Yet, as noted above, arbitration also 
boasts powerful tradeoffs: it reduces the burden on the parties and the 
judiciary.211  Conversely, when parties adopt unique procedural 
principles—but remain in court—they do not tap into those benefits.  In 
fact, by forcing judges to comply with idiosyncratic rules, they likely 
increase the strain on the court system. 
In sum, the need to avoid negative externalities provides some 
support for the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights 
doctrine.  In other contexts, however, the very parties that these 
principles purport to protect also benefit from one-sided arbitration 
clauses, complicating the matter.  Accordingly, in the next section, I 
analyze the federal law of arbitrability through a different rationale for 
inalienability: non-commodification theory. 
C. Non-Commodification 
Outside of the domain of economic analysis, scholars have defended 
inalienability on the ground that it prevents commodification.212  These 
                                                          
 207. See St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898) 
(“[S]ettlements of matters in litigation or in dispute without recourse to litigation are generally 
favored.”).  But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984) (arguing 
that courts do not simply resolve disputes between parties, but also articulate social norms). 
 208. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). 
 209. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 204, at 510–16. 
 210. See id. at 550 (noting concerns about “[t]he effects of contract procedure on the quality of 
the political process”). 
 211. This is not to say that I believe that these benefits outweigh the costs of arbitration (at least 
in the consumer and employment settings).  As I have discussed in a previous article, rampant 
private procedural rulemaking through arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts raises the very 
transparency concerns that Davis and Hershkoff cite.  See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 480–81 (2011). 
 212. See generally Radin, supra note 33. 
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diverse perspectives revolve around the same rough idea: sometimes, to 
permit the sale of a cherished thing would change the thing itself.  In this 
Part, I argue that similar concerns animate the statutory waiver rule and 
the vindication of rights doctrine.  These principles help preserve the 
distinctive character of public lawmaking in an era where private parties 
wield legislative-like power. 
The port of departure for non-commodification theory is Margaret 
Radin’s article, Market-Inalienability.213  Radin claims that inalienability 
can help preserve human flourishing.214  As she notes, even speaking 
about highly personal objects or attributes in market rhetoric can be 
damaging.215  For instance, some economists explain the criminalization 
of rape as an effort to preserve the “marriage market.”216  Yet, as Radin 
argues, this language takes a small step toward normalizing rape: it 
conceives of bodily integrity as detached and fungible—something that 
can be invaded if the benefits outweigh the costs.217  This is problematic 
because of what Radin calls the “domino effect”: “once market value 
enters our discourse, market rhetoric will take over and characterize 
every interaction in terms of market value.”218  For instance, if 
prostitution were legal, the open commodification of sex—lurid 
billboards and cold discussions about the price of intimacy—would alter 
“our very conception of sexuality and our sexual feelings.”219  Radin thus 
proposes that things that are closely entwined with personhood should 
remain inalienable.220 
More importantly for my purposes, scholars have also invoked the 
non-commodification norm to explain the inalienability of certain civic 
rights and responsibilities.  For instance, the meaning of “citizenship” 
would change if individuals could pawn off jury duty or compliance with 
the military draft.221  Likewise, Cass Sunstein has argued that “core vote 
buying” (paying people to cast ballots a certain way) would transform 
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our “conception of what voting is for—about the values that it 
embodies—and this changed conception would have corrosive effects on 
politics.”222  Similarly, Rick Hasen has considered the slightly narrower 
issue of whether candidates may offer incentives to increase voter 
turnout.223  Hasen notes that such a scheme would have a tendency to 
alter the very definition of voting: 
The vote, which tens of thousands gave their blood and sweat to secure, 
is not a commodity that ought to be crassly traded for cash in the 
political marketplace. 
The concern here is that payments for turnout, whether directed to 
all voters or targeted only at voters in certain areas, brings a money 
calculation into the picture in much the same way as core vote buying.  
It tells us that voting might be for getting a discounted ham, and not for 
choosing the best leaders.224 
Likewise, allowing the pre-dispute sale of federal statutory rights 
would have a caustic influence on politics.  Although money plays a 
huge role in elections, we shield the actual casting of ballots—the core 
input of the democratic machinery—from the market.225  As a result, it 
makes sense to create a buffer zone around legislation, the primary 
output of this process.  And like Radin’s domino effect or Sunstein and 
Hasen’s concern about corrosion, enforcing prospective waivers of 
federal statutory rights would transform congressional lawmaking into 
something else.  It would allow drafters to prevent public laws from ever 
taking root.  This would change federal statutes into mere default rules: 
the functional equivalent of private law.  In turn, this false parity between 
the two spheres would cause us to lose sight of public law’s unique 
dimensions. 
For one, public law has a pedigree that private law does not.  
Bicameralism and presentment condition the passage of a statute on 
approval by both chambers of Congress and the President: 
representatives who serve diverse constituencies.226  This de facto super-
majoritarianism requirement diminishes the risk of capture by a single, 
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powerful interest.227  Moreover, we generally assume that public servants 
attempt, at least in part, to further their conception of the common 
good.228  In stark contrast, drafters of adhesion contracts—powerful 
interests incarnate—seek to advance their own agendas.  As a result, we 
generally deny private parties the ability to make law.229  It would be 
anomalous if we allowed them to un-make law. 
To be sure, in other contexts, we encourage private parties to 
participate in governance.  Standard-setting organizations promulgate 
regulations and companies work in tandem with the state to deliver 
services under entitlement programs.230  Law reform projects such as the 
Uniform Commercial Code or Uniform Trust Code are drafted by 
lawyers and then presented for legislative approval.231  Industries such as 
cattle ranching and diamond selling often create “order without law” 
through norm-based dispute resolution systems.232  In these examples, 
however, the government and private parties share the same goals.  
Conversely, a drafter who inserts a prospective waiver of statutory rights 
into a contract has interests that are directly antagonistic to the state. 
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Because boilerplate is a kind of contagion, enforcing such a term would 
cause it to spread, blurring the line between public and private power. 
In addition, equating public and private law would destroy the 
expressive function of legislation.  Statutes do not just govern citizens.  
Instead, they “communicate[] social values” and “thereby change 
behavior.”233  For instance, seatbelt laws and non-smoking ordinances 
have helped people reconsider even deeply entrenched habits.234  
Likewise, banning insider trading or racial discrimination is a singular 
way to stigmatize wrongdoing, as “people’s views of the acceptability 
and even morality of those actions change.”235  At the opposite pole, 
commentators have credited the Americans with Disabilities Act with 
altering disabled persons’ identities by highlighting the contributions 
they make to the workforce.236  Allowing federal law to be eclipsed by 
private agreement would narrow its scope and thus imperil its ability to 
shape norms.  It would also undermine the very idea that public law is 
expressive by deeming it to be fungible with private law, which we do 
not think of as expressive. 
Finally, enforcing prospective waivers of federal statutory rights 
would ignore the relationship between regulation and the market.  Often, 
Congress legislates because private ordering has failed to bring about a 
certain result.  Antidiscrimination laws, for instance, remedy the fact that 
“[t]he labor market, operating freely, had not and would not provide fair 
employment opportunities for women, racial, ethnic and religious 
minorities, and older and disabled individuals.”237  Mandatory securities 
disclosures exist because “market forces are inadequate to produce the 
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socially optimal supply of research.”238  Antitrust statutes forbid 
anticompetitive conduct.239  Because these laws are intended to constrain 
market participants,240 it would be perverse to trust the market with these 
laws.  Indeed, there is no reason to think that an after-the-fact market for 
statutory rights would not suffer from the same infirmities that inspired 
the regulation in the first instance.  Thus, permitting the pre-dispute sale 
of federal statutory rights would prescribe the disease as cure. 
Of course, not all regulation is wise, and private decision-making is 
often superior to its public counterpart.  Moreover, congressionally 
created rights can be under-enforced or entrusted to unworthy or 
incompetent plaintiffs.  My point is simply that if private parties can 
erase federal statutes through the mechanism of mass contracting, then 
federal law ceases to be federal law.  It becomes something cheaper: a 
state-produced version of the same boilerplate that appears in credit card 
statements, car rental contracts, or end-user license agreements.  The 
statutory waiver rule acts as a gate at the top of this slippery slope.  It 
helps preserve a role for public law in light of the massive rise of private 
power. 
For these reasons, judges should be especially suspicious of 
arbitration clauses that try to rewrite Congress’s handiwork.  A rough 
proxy for this phenomenon should be whether a provision overrides 
some aspect of a statutory scheme and yet does not serve any arbitration-
related purpose.  Cost-splitting provisions would be an example of a term 
that is not objectionable under this rubric.  Although these clauses alter a 
background assumption under which Congress legislates—that plaintiffs 
will be able to pursue statutory claims in the publicly subsidized court 
system—they are logically related to extrajudicial dispute resolution.  
After all, someone needs to pay the private judge.  But pay-your-own-
way and loser-pays clauses are more troubling.  Pay-your-own-way 
provisions override federal statutes that expressly empower successful 
plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees, and loser-pays terms reverse 
the American rule.  At the same time, they are naked attempts to deter 
claims: they have no relationship whatsoever to the uniqueness of the  
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arbitral forum.  Courts should not hesitate to nullify them when they 
conflict with the congressional blueprint for vindicating statutory rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this Article, I introduced Kate, a Title VII 
claimant, and asked whether a court should enforce her former 
employer’s arbitration clause despite its cost-splitting, loser-pays, pay-
your-own-way, and anti-class action provisions.  Courts currently 
disagree over how to assess whether these terms thwart a plaintiff’s 
federal statutory rights.  I have argued that they can better understand the 
stakes by conceptualizing the vindication of rights doctrine and its 
underlying principle, the statutory waiver rule, as a species of 
inalienability.  For one, they should recognize that the efficiency 
rationale for enforcing adhesive arbitration clauses applies with less 
force to claims like Kate’s, which seek redress for the violation of rights 
that are incommensurable with money.  In addition, they should be 
particularly suspicious of loser-pays and pay-your-own-way provisions, 
which—unlike cost-sharing terms—have no relationship to the arbitral 
process.  Allowing drafters to rewrite Congress’ handiwork through these 
terms aggrandizes private parties and undermines the rule of law. 
